CCN 1971 Ops

We are trying to collect copies of all awards for personnel earned while participating in/supporting MACVSOG Operations. If you have orders/awards/documents which can add to the information shown, please send copies by snail mail to 2314 Cheshire Lane, Houston, TX 77018. (PLEASE DO NOT EMAIL!!!) Use the following table to help identify operations and provide your comments as thread in the appropriate forum noted:

As I pull awards, I may be able to ID and provide more details for some of these operations. The concept is that all operations are given a number indicating CCS, CCC, CCN and the year; reporting period, sequential number, type of element [RT (Recon Team), HT (Halo Team), ST (STRATA Team, NOT Spike Team), SF (Security Force), HF (Hatchet Force), AT (ARVN-led RT), AP (ARVN-led Platoon), BL (Bright Light), WC (WACO CITY)] and an identifier, if known. In the discussion/forum, you can add threads to the Reporting period, reference the operation identification number.

(TS) Periodic wrap-up briefings were presented to COMUSMACV and key members of his staff throughout 1971 which summarized MACSOG’s activities. These briefings included detailed presentations of operations and served to keep COMUSMACV fully cognizant of SOG’s capabilities, limitations, reductions, restrictions and accomplishments. No briefings of 1972 operations were given to COMUSMACV or any other key individuals because of the paucity of operations. Resumes of the briefing highlights which follow represent a chronological summary of MACSOG operations during 1971. Although reconnaissance teams were assigned specific target areas within or near a given base area (BA), only the general ‘BA’s are referred to in summarizing the operations (Figure B-16).

In Prairie Fire Area of Operations (PFAO) thirteen teams were deployed during the reporting period and spent a total of thirty-four operational days in Laos.

In general, teams were targeted to monitor the roads in the Rte 96/100 complex and throughout the PFAO.

[CCN71-01-01-RT AK] On 24 Dec 70, a US-led RT was inserted into the northeastern portion of BA 611. On the 28th, at noon, the team heard an OV-10 FAC aircraft flying approximately 100 meters to their southwest. The aircraft made a low pass into the valley to the immediate north in an apparent effort to get under the cloud cover. Approximately one minute later, the team heard two muffled explosions about three kilometers to the northwest. On the 8th, a FAC, flying in support of MACSOG observed the wreckage of the OV-10. [CCN71-01-02-BL ??] A MACSOG Bright Light Team was inserted into the crash site on the 8th. Two hours later, the reaction team and the bodies of both crewmembers were recovered. There were no indications that the enemy had been at the scene of the crash. The cause of the crash is not known.

[CCN71-01-03-RT ARVN] On 22 Dec 70, an ARVN-led RT was inserted near Rte 103 west of the DMZ. On the 26th, the team heard an estimated ten enemy moving approximately 30 meters to its northwest. At this time, the team also heard a previously implanted M-14 mine explode and several of the enemy started yelling. Three and one half hours later, the team made contact with an enemy squad, resulting in no friendly and unknown enemy casualties. The team was extracted while helicopter gunships provided suppressive fires.

[CCN71-01-04-RT ??] A US-led RT was able to spend only two hours and thirty minutes west of the DMZ, in Laos, on the 27th of Dec 70. The team heard enemy activity 125 meters northwest of the LZ, and after directing two helicopter gunships against the enemy position with unknown results, was extracted.

Effective 1 Jan 71, the Vietnamese Special Forces were reorganized and placed under the command of the Strategic Technical Directorate or STD.

In the PRAIRIE FIRE AO, a total of thirty-five teams were active, spending a total of 104 operational days on the ground. Specific target areas have been the Rte 96/110 complexes and the Pt. 92B/1032/925 complex. In addition, four teams were inserted in support of operation SILVER BUCKLE.

In the central PRAIRIE FIRE AO, nine teams were active in the target areas indicated.

[CCN71-02-01-RT AN] A US-led reconnaissance team was inserted with a mission of roadwatch on Rte 922. The team was inserted on the 18th, but was extracted after thirty minutes on the ground when the team made contact with ten enemy resulting in one SCU WIA, three enemy KIA (BC), and six enemy KIA (EST). Gunships engaging enemy positions obtained four secondary explosions and the team was extracted under light enemy small arms fire. This team was reinserted on its alternate LZ. The team killed eight enemy, withdrew to its insertion LZ, and was extracted without further incident fifteen minutes after insertion.

[CCN71-02-02-RT ??] A US-led reconnaissance team was inserted north of BA 611 on 16 Jan to conduct an area reconnaissance and emplace mines on roads and trails. Shortly after insertion, one team member heard magazines being inserted into weapons approximately ten meters ahead of his position. Another team member then observed, engaged, and killed one enemy at a range of five meters. The team then engaged an estimated enemy platoon at close range. Two SCU were directed to recover the body of the dead enemy and did so. He was found to be armed with a K-54 pistol, wore a good quality Russian watch, and carried a case containing a number of documents. Contact was established with air assets and the team began to withdraw under fire towards its insertion LZ. The enemy continued to attempt to overwhelm the team and three SCU were wounded by small arms fire. The team was extracted thirty-five minutes after insertion under intense enemy ground fire. The documents captured dealt primarily with the political-military training school of the VC Tri-Thien-Hue Military Region. Among other things, these documents confirmed the identity of the school commander.

Four teams were active in the extreme northern portion of the PRAIRIE FIRE AO during this reporting period. Enemy activity in the area was lighter than normal.

Three teams walked off the Hickory Radio Relay Site. One reported significant enemy activity.

[CCN71-02-03-RT PY] A US-led reconnaissance team with a mission of area reconnaissance departed Hickory on 13 Jan and headed toward their target area just north of Hickory. On 16080311, as the team was preparing to depart its RON position, the team leader observed twenty enemy approaching the teams position, walking in a relaxed manner. Claymore mines were detonated, resulting in six enemy KIA (BC) and five enemy KIA (EST). The remaining enemy regrouped and assaulted the team’s position. The team leader detonated four claymore mines resulting in an additional three enemy KIA (BC).

Southwest of the DMZ, two teams were active. [CCN71-02-07-RT VA] One team was inserted on 9 Jan. Immediately after the insertion, the team heard an individual call ‘OPEN FIRE’ in a North Vietnamese dialect. The team was extracted under intense small arms fire. [CCN71-02-08-RT MC] A second team was inserted into this target area on 12 Jan; the team remained active for seven days and was extracted on 18 Jan upon completion of its mission.

[CCN71-02-09-HF ??] Two ARVN platoons conducted shake down missions south of the DMZ. [CCN71-02-10-HF ??]

The number of insertions into the PFAO more than doubled over the previous reporting period. This was primarily due to the improved weather in the northern portion of the AO. However, the teams continued to experience numerous contacts with enemy forces and the percentage of teams able to remain in their assigned target areas for more than twenty-four hours remained at about 40%. The only significant change in enemy reactions occurred in the northern sector, where two teams were able to remain in their target areas for a total of twelve days. The possibility exists that enemy troops that had been operating in this area, in and east of BA 604, have been shifted further south to counter friendly forces in operation ‘SILVER BUCKLE.’

A total of forty-four teams were active in the PFAO, spending a total of 130 operational days on the ground. Specific target areas included the Rte 96/110 complex and three missions were flown in and to the west of BA 614 in support of operation ‘SILVER BUCKLE.’ Additionally, missions were run on the ground in support of operation ‘DEWEY-CANYON’ in the Co Roc mountain area.

MACSOG ran diversionary operations in support of operations ‘SILVER BUCKLE’ and ‘Lam Son 719.’ Operations commenced on 12 Jan in support of ‘SILVER BUCKLE.’ Between 12 and 17 Jan, eleven diversionary DZ’s were used. Four DZ’s received reconnaissance teams by helicopter. [CCN71-03-01-RT ??], [CCN71-03-02-RT ??], [CCN71-03-03-RT ??], [CCN71-03-04-RT ??] All four teams were extracted soon after insertion due to enemy movement and contact. The remaining DZ’s were used for simulated parachute raider and actual bundle insertions.

On 6 Feb, SOG began a series of notional team parachute insertions, employing phantom rigged parachutes and resupply bundles, as part of diversionary operations in the vicinity of 614 in support of Operation ‘SILVER BUCKLE.’ and ‘Lam Son 719.’

[CCN71-03-05-RT ?? Watson?] Two US-led reconnaissance teams were active in BA 607. A US team was inserted on 18 Feb. The next day, the team was surrounded by enemy. On the morning of the 19th, between 0130 and 0300, the team heard an unknown number of tracked vehicles to the southwest. [CCN71-03-06-RT PY?] Activity in the other team’s target area was also intense. Shortly after insertion, the team made contact.

Four US [CCN71-03-07-RT ??], [CCN71-03-08-RT ??], [CCN71-03-09-RT ??], [CCN71-03-10-RT ??] and two ARVN teams [CCN71-03-11-RT ARVN??] were active in and around BA 611. [CCN71-03-12-RT ARVN??] On 18 Feb, an ARVN-led team was attempting to insert when the CH-53 struck a tree stump and crash landed on the LZ. Two US crew members and three SCU were injured. All personnel were immediately recovered by a second CH-53. In a nearby target area, the same team was inserted twice on 24 Jan. Eight minutes after the first insertion, the team heard heavy enemy activity northwest of their position. The team was then extracted and reinserted fifteen minutes later on its alternate LZ. The team remained overnight and the following day was extracted because of continuous enemy movement around their position. On 19 Feb, a FAC flying in support of MACSOG operations, received thirty to forty rounds of fire from two 37mm AAA positions. The FAC directed TACAIR against the gun positions resulting in one 37mm gun position destroyed and one gun damaged. The FAC also observed two additional 37mm positions, and again TACAIR was directed against these positions, resulting in another gun destroyed and one more damaged.

Three US-led teams [CCN71-03-13-RT ??], [CCN71-03-14-RT ??], [CCN71-03-15-RT ??] and two ARVN-led platoons [CCN71-03-16-AP ??], [CCN71-03-17-AP ??] were inserted on Co Roc Mountain in support of operations ‘DEWEY CANYON II’ and Lam Son 719.’ One platoon remained active for eleven days, but observed no enemy activity and was extracted on 7 Feb. On 31 Jan, a US-led team [CCN71-03-18-RT ??], attempted insertion, however, four SCU sustained leg injuries and the entire team was extracted. North of BA 604, two ARVN-led teams [CCN71-03-19-AT ??], [CCN71-03-20-AT ??], were inserted to conduct area reconnaissance missions and to monitor enemy reaction to Operation ‘Lam Son 719.’ On 14 Feb. one team was extracted after directing three F-4’s and two A-1’s against an estimated enemy company in the open, resulting in an estimated thirty to forty enemy KBA. The other team made contact on 16 Feb with an estimated enemy company, resulting in no friendly and unknown enemy casualties. [CCN71-03-21-RT ??], Moving south, a US-led team with a wiretap mission installed two taps on commo wire, resulting in three hours of voice and modulated HF tones taped. The team was extracted and a checkout of the tape determined that no useable signal could be obtained due to the age and state of deterioration of the line that was tapped.

A second team [CCN71-03-21-RT HA?], experienced trouble during extraction after spending five uneventful days in the target area. Three UH-1H’s, one AH-1G, and one O-2 sustained minor damage, and one US medic [Woodham] was slightly WIA by ground fire.

In the southern PRAIRIE FIRE AO, Rte’s 96 and 110, through BA’s 609 and 613 continued to receive light vehicular traffic, which appeared to be intended for transshipment of supplies, rather than storage. During the reporting period, no indications of a change of this pattern were discerned. Teams active in this area also maintained the same stay patterns as previous reporting periods, with only 40% of the teams active realizing more than a twenty-four hour stay time. The central portion of BA 609 remained the most active area, as evidenced by five attempts to insert one team on twelve separate LZ’s, all meeting with enemy fire. In the central PFAO no teams were active during this period, while to the north, twenty teams were active, with such support given to ‘Lam Son 719’ in the Co Roc Mountain area. No particular trends or indications were noted during this period, but this was probably due to ‘Lam Son 719’ and the fluid situation it produced.

Activity was primarily restricted to the BA 609/613 tri-border area, while fourteen US elements and one ARVN element were active on the Vietnamese side of the border. Insertions of teams into the northern portion of PRAIRIE FIRE were hampered by the lack of air assets which had been dedicated to the ARVN operation in Laos.

To the south of BA 614, four US-led reconnaissance teams were active. The first [CCN71-04-01-RT ??] made contact with two enemy, resulting in one enemy KIA and the other WIA. The team then began receiving B-40 rocket and small arms fire from an estimated platoon size enemy force. Three A-1’s and four UH-1H gunships were directed against the enemy positions. One A-1 and one UH-1H were hit, but returned safely to base. The team was then extracted and reinserted on 21 Mar. The following day, the team ambushed five enemy, resulting in no friendly and unknown enemy casualties. One rucksack and twenty enemy uniforms were captured.

A second reconnaissance team [CCN71-04-02-RT ??] was inserted on 16 Mar and on the 23rd, made contact with an estimated squad size force, resulting in no friendly and an estimated four enemy KIA, plus one enemy WIA. This team also monitored a North Vietnamese dialect UHF transmission, during which one station informed another station that Americans were in the area.

Two US-led reconnaissance teams were active in the area to the northeast of BA 607. The first team [CCN71-04-05-RT ??] was inserted on 22 Feb, and extracted on 24 Feb, due to a reallocation of helicopter assets. The second team [CCN71-04-06-RT HA?] was active from 18 to 20 Feb. On the 19th, at 2140 hours, the team was attacked by an unknown size enemy force resulting in no friendly casualties and an estimated thirteen enemy KIA. During this contact, the team received a total of thirty airbursts in the vicinity of its location from a suspected 37mm AAA weapon. From 0255 to 0310 the next morning, the team observed forty to sixty enemy one hundred meters southwest of its location. The team engaged the enemy, resulting in an estimated five enemy KIA. At 0310, the team directed one Spectre aircraft against the enemy positions for twenty-five minutes. During the initial firing pass, the team heard numerous screams from the target area. Subsequent fire directed at the target caused a cessation of all activity. On the 20th, from 0630 until its extraction, the team received sporadic sniper fire from 360 degrees around its position. The small arms, machine gun, and B-40 rocket fire, resulting in one SCU KIA. Subsequent detailed debriefs of the team members indicated up to three hundred enemy killed by air. Since FAC confirmation could not be obtained, SOG listed this as an estimate.

North of BA 611, one US-led team [CCN71-04-07-RT ??] was on a trailwatch mission, and one US-led team [CCN71-04-08-RT ??] spent two days on a roadwatch mission along Rte 922. The roadwatch made contact with an unknown size enemy force, resulting in one US WIA and unknown enemy casualties.

Only two elements were active in the DMZ area. A US-led reconnaissance team [CCN71-04-09-RT ??] was active from 18 to 20 Feb. On the 20th, the team heard extensive movement around its position. The team directed airstrikes against suspected enemy positions with unobserved results.

In this same area, a FAC, flying in support of MACSOG operations, observed eight large trucks loaded with POL and supplies. TACAIR was directed against the enemy force with unknown results.

Due to ‘Lam Son 719,’ MACSOG was not active in the northern PRAIRIE FIRE area of operations. South of BA 611 in the central portion of the AO, teams operating principally in Vietnam encountered enemy forces up to estimated platoon size. These encounters occurred frequently on the insert LZ, thus indicating the enemy’s preparedness for countering reconnaissance elements in Vietnam as well as Laos. Activity in the southern AO continued at substantially the same level. North of BA 609 and in BA 609, the enemy’s activity remained at a moderate level. Teams operating adjacent to the border in Vietnam continually noted signs of enemy activity and had frequent encounters with enemy personnel, usually small groups of three to ten. Attempts by MACSOG elements to reconnoiter enemy LOC’s generally met intense enemy resistance.

In late Mar, the nicknames SALEM HOUSE and PRAIRIE FIRE were compromised by Jack Anderson and were changed on 8 Apr to THOT NOT for Cambodia and PHU DUNG for Laos.

Except for one team [CCN71-05-01-RT ??] in the Salient, activity in the PHU DUNG AO and on the Laotian side of the border was confined to the west of BA 607 and southward. This was caused by limitations against use of US reconnaissance teams in Laos and prohibitive weather factors. A noticeable increase was shown in the number of US-led reconnaissance teams active on the Vietnamese side of the border and in the DMZ or NICKEL STEEL area. This reflected the return of air assets to Task Force One Advisory Element following Lam Son 719.’

Of the three teams active to the south of BA 614, only one US-led team [CCN71-05-02-RT ??] reported significant enemy activity. It made contact with an estimated enemy platoon, resulting in four enemy KIA. Two F-4’s were directed against the enemy positions with unknown results.

Both teams in BA 614 [CCN71-05-05-RT ??] were confronted with extensive enemy activity. The southern team [CCN71-05-06-RT ??] made contact with an enemy platoon in which two SCU were killed and five enemy were killed.

Rte 966 received much traffic. [CCN71-05-07-RT ??] A team reported hearing nine trucks while a sensor string reported ten movers. During the morning of the 31st, the team heard extensive enemy activity in its vicinity and then began receiving sporadic small arms and automatic weapons fire. The team directed eight F-4’s and two F-100’s against enemy troop and gun positions. The airstrikes resulted in four automatic weapons silenced, three mortar positions destroyed, and the suppression of all enemy movement and activity in the target area. TACAIR was also directed at a trench line and ammo cache, resulting in several secondary explosions.

All five ARVN elements inside Laos had enemy contacts and spent an average of three days in their respective target areas. They had a total of six contacts with the enemy. Five contacts were with squad size elements, and resulted in one SCU KIA. One platoon, active 14 to 17 Apr, was the first insertion of an ARVN-led commando platoon in the northern part of the PHU DUNG AO.

US-led reconnaissance teams were very active on the Vietnamese side of the border, and they all averaged less than two day’s stay time, with the exception of one team, in the Ashau Valley, which spent nine days in its area and reported no significant enemy activity. [CCN71-05-13-RT ??]

Another team [CCN71-05-14-RT ??] made contact with an estimated thirty enemy resulting in two US WIA, three SCU WIA, nine enemy KIA, and possibly twenty-four more enemy KIA.

One of the US-led teams, [CCN71-05-13-RT ??] active from 11 to 14 Apr, reported extensive enemy activity, including two occasions when the enemy fired forty-five 122mm rockets at an unknown target twenty-one seconds away.

On 21 Apr, an ARVN-led platoon [CCN71-05-14-AP ??] was inserted into the Laotian Salient without incident. The next day, the platoon made contact with an estimated 300 enemy, resulting in ten SCU WIA, nine MIA, and unknown enemy casualties. During the extraction one UH-1H was shot down and burned on impact. Two crew members were wounded. All crew members were subsequently extracted with the platoon.

An attempt to monitor Rte 548 on 3 Apr was foiled by the enemy and the US-led team [CCN71-05-15-RT KT] was extracted after only 2½ hours on the ground. The team received fire from all sides.

US-led teams were active in the DMZ/NICKEL STEEL area. [CCN71-05-16-RT ??] On 6 Apr, one UH-1H experienced engine failure during an insertion and crashed on the LZ, resulting in one US crew member and three team members injured.

A second team [CCN71-05-17-RT ??] heard suspected 5lmm machine gun fire and two suspected 152mm guns fire a total of eight rounds. Two Cobra gunships were directed against the enemy firing positions resulting in two large secondary explosions.

Task Force One Advisory Element relieved the First of the Fifth Mech on Hill 950 (HICKORY) at the Radio Relay Site. Enemy activity on 19, 20 and 21 Apr indicated attempts to at least determine the extent of friendly presence, and may portend attack of the site in the near future.

Teams confirmed that Rte 110 was still being used. The northern portion of BA 609 experienced heavy enemy activity, for the area further than ten kilometers west of BA 609 was lightly used by the enemy. Four kilometers south of the Golf-5 Radio Relay Site, moderate enemy activity was noted, indicating that, as in the past, the area along the Dak Xou stream may receive Increased enemy use during the wet season.

An enemy LOC about twenty-two kilometers north of BA 609 in the Dak Rolong Stream Valley was still receiving moderate use. Enemy personnel returned to their former base camps, ten to fifteen kilometers north of BA 609, to prepare for the wet season in a major rice production area.

Teams operating in and around BA 607 noted heavy enemy use of the low lands, particularly stream valleys. Rte 614 is in use and possible LZ’s were noted as containing cut trees with remaining tree trunks being three meters high to prevent helicopter landings.

Documents found on a PW (who died before he could be interrogated) indicated that the 802nd Battalion of Group 4 of the Military Region Tri-Thien-Hue operated in the vicinity of the Yavor Stream Valley approximately fifteen kilometers east of BA 607. The documents indicated that Group 4 had eleven subordinate units (possibly company size), six with new recruits and newly assigned cadre. The unit was undergoing a consolidation process, but still had combat responsibilities to harass enemy communications LOC’s and coordinate with local force elements to conduct counter special forces activities. The document continued with instructions from the Current Affairs Committee warning of a possible series of special forces type raids on VC/NVA rear bases. Units were directed to commemorate 19 May (Ho Chi Minh’s Birthday) with combat victory.

Reconnaissance teams operating in the central portion of the NICKEL STEEL AO noted a lack of enemy activity while those operating in the eastern portion of the zone noted heavy artillery fire along with enemy activity.

The conversion of commando platoons from US to ARVN leadership for the PHU DUNG AO progressed somewhat slower than expected due to lack of air assets.

Activity was confined primarily to BA’s 609, 613, the DMZ and in and around BA 607. For the second successive month, there was an increase in the number of US-led reconnaissance teams active on the Vietnamese side of the border and in the DMZ or NICKEL STEEL area. In addition, three ARVN-led platoons were active on the Vietnamese side of the border.

An ARVN-led reconnaissance team [CCN71-06-01-AT ??] spent a total of eleven days in their area in Laos and reported negative significant enemy activity. Negative enemy activity was also reported by an ARVN-led platoon [CCN71-06-02-AP ??] which was active from 8-12 May.

Four ARVN-led reconnaissance teams reported significant enemy activity. One team [CCN71-06-03-AT ??] made contact with an enemy squad shortly after insertion, resulting in one ARVN WIA and one enemy KIA. During the extraction, one UH-1H sustained battle damage and was forced to land in the vicinity of the LZ. After landing, the aircraft began burning and was destroyed. The aircrew and team members were extracted without further incident.

Another team [CCN71-06-04-AT ??] was assaulted by an estimated twenty-five enemy. The team evaded and was extracted.

An ARVN-led roadwatch team [CCN71-06-05-AT ??] was inserted near Rte 923. On 12 May, one SCU was wounded when a mine detonated. The team was extracted by high hover using rope slings and flown to Fire Support Base ‘Rendezvous’ in Vietnam to be transferred to other helicopters. While at the support base, three SCU were wounded during a mortar and ground attack. One of the wounded SCU suffered a broken neck and subsequently died while enroute to a hospital. Two UH-1H helicopters were hit, but returned to base safely.

All of the US-led reconnaissance teams on the Vietnamese side of the border reported significant enemy activity.

One team [CCN71-06-07-RT ??] during insert had three of its members on the ground when they began receiving small arms fire. The three were extracted and the mission was aborted.

On 29 Apr, two attempts were made to insert southeast of BA 607. In both cases, [CCN71-06-08-RT ??], [CCN71-06-09 RT ??] three of the team members were on the ground when the enemy opened up with small arms fire. In both extractions, A-1’s struck the enemy positions. Another team [CCN71-06-10-RT ??] in this area on 13 May made no significant sightings after helicopter doorgunners killed three enemy during insertion. While departing the target area, helicopters received an undetermined amount of suspected 23mm AAA from two positions.

Nearby, a US-led reconnaissance team [CCN71-06-11-RT ASP] was inserted on 3 May. Radio contact was made with the team ten minutes after insertion. From that time on, no further contact was made with the team. All attempts to communicate failed. On the 7th a body recovery mission was aborted because of enemy activity around the intended LZ. Three US and five SCU are carried as MIA. Continuous area coverage was in effect to locate these personnel. There were indications that they may have been captured.

A US-led roadwatch team [CCN71-06-12-RT Indigo] was inserted to monitor Rte 548 on 14 May. The team reported that five trucks had stopped on Rte 614 to the north of their location. The team also reported enemy movement 360 degrees around its position. At 0135 hours on the 15th, the team directed one AC-119 against the trucks, resulting in five secondary explosions and a cessation of enemy movement. On 17 May another AC-119 was directed against enemy truck locations, resulting in five secondary explosions. This team also had one contact with three enemy and killed one. On the 19th, the team sighted an estimated fifteen enemy trucks. Due to poor weather, TACAIR could not be called in. At midnight on the 19th, the team reported receiving small arms fire and grenades from an unknown size enemy force. The team then observed an undetermined number of trucks. A fixed wing gunship was on station, but was unable to expend because of low cloud ceilings. When the gunships go below the ceilings, pre-set computer inputs make it impossible to fire because of the angle of bank required. On the 20th, the team reported monitoring a VC conversation that stated that they were going to take the hill occupied by the team and that the VC had four US captured in action from recon teams. This team remained in position and interdicted the road for ten days. This had been the longest stay time on the ground in this area for several months. The team was resupplied at its own request to continue operations. A flip-flop took place on the 22nd. They carried one 57mm recoilless rifle and retained one 8mm mortar.

An ARVN-led team [CCN71-06-13-AT ??] on a roadwatch mission along Rte 926 reported that during the night of the 16th an unknown size AAA weapon fired throughout the night. On the 17th, at 1915 hours, this team reported observing an enemy tank.

On 7 May, a US-led four man reconnaissance team [CCN71-06-14-RT ID] was parachuted in, using HALO techniques at night. During the insertion two team members were injured and subsequently extracted. The two remaining team members continued their mission throughout their four day stay in the area. The team was targeted against a storage area which they could not locate. The HALO insert was apparently undetected.

Northeast of BA 611, there was one team insertion [CCN71-06-15-RT AK] and two WACO CITY body recovery missions. The team was inserted on a roadwatch mission along an unnumbered road on 15 May. On the 17th contact was made with an enemy force, resulting in one US KIA, two US and five SCU WIA. During an attempted extraction two helicopters were shot down, resulting in three US crewmembers MIA. One helicopter was destroyed and one was recovered on the 18th. A WACO CITY body recovery team [CCN71-06-16-WC ??] was inserted and made contact with an unknown size enemy force resulting in one SCU KIA, one SCU and one US WIA. The recovery team was then extracted. A second WACO CITY team [CCN71-06-17-WC ??] was inserted and recovered the bodies of two US and one SCU KIA. The team also located and extracted two US crewmembers who were WIA. One additional crewmember was observed to be KIA and pinned under the aircraft wreckage. The remaining one US team member and one US crewmember were not found and continued to be carried as MIA.

In the DMZ/NICKEL STEEL area, an ARVN-led platoon [CCN71-06-18-AP ??] made contact with one enemy, whom they wounded and then captured. The PW expired shortly after extraction. On 20 May, another team [CCN71-06-19-AT ??] captured an enemy cache containing one M-60 machine gun, two M-16 rifles, one B-40 rocket launcher and one claymore mine.

MACSOG refined PW capture techniques and stepped up these operations. However, we found that the captured PW’s are dying from leg wounds and other apparently minor wounds, that ordinarily would not be fatal. Consultation with medical personnel suggested that the mental conditioning the enemy receives about the consequences of capture causes undue shock or lack of will to survive, thereby contributing to the deaths of PW’s. In recent weeks we experienced two such cases, despite rapid, expert medical care.

Fifteen targets were run throughout the DMZ. In almost every instance, the enemy was encountered during, or very soon after insertion, and helicopters received small arms and 51 caliber antiaircraft fire.

This operational concept should enhance the conduct of short team exploitation missions in the PHU DUNG AO and areas adjacent to the border to exploit lucrative enemy sightings. A ‘Spike Team’ will vary in size from one reconnaissance team to a platoon minus and carry additional weapons and ammunition. The team’s mission may vary and is dependent on the type of target identified. Missions may include PW capture, mining or raids against known or suspected targets that may be exploited by a small quick reaction force. Several of the missions this month were run under this concept. The "Spike Team’ provides MACSOG with additional flexibility in exploitation and interdiction roles.

The area between the Dak Xou river and northern BA 609 continued to have extensive enemy activity. Four kilometers northeast of BA 609 there was increased trail use, as the enemy returns to his base camps for the wet season. The area twenty kilometers southwest of BA 607 still received enemy attention. The trails were well used and up to a platoon size enemy security patrols were encountered. The eastern portion of BA 607 was used as a staging and rear-service agricultural area. Heavy enemy activity was noted to include defense of a portion of the area by a possible 23mm AAA weapon east of BA 607. Team reports indicated Rte 614 received more traffic than last month. It was successfully interdicted when a reconnaissance team directed TACAIR on ten trucks, causing a total of ten secondary explosions. In the northern portion of the area of operations, teams reported heavy enemy activity north of the Salient in the vicinity of Rte 615, indicating increased use of this LOC. One team reported a tank on Rte 926, two kilometers west of the border. In the DMZ, all teams inserted met stiff enemy resistance. MACSOG employed a variety of diversionary actions to aid insertions.

On 10 Apr, MACV requested authority to reinsert US-led reconnaissance teams in the PHU DUNG AO. On 19 May, JCS transmitted a set of questions from OSD which reflected their desire to use only ARVN-led teams. MACV responded to the JCS message by outlining the MACSOG Improvement and Modernization Program which seeks to completely Vietnamize operations in the PHU DUNG AO by 1 Jul 72. The impracticality of greatly accelerating this program was pointed out. Moreover, the requirement to use US-led reconnaissance teams in the PHU DUNG AO to provide needed quantity and quality of effort was reiterated.

In the PHU DUNG and DMZ areas sixty-six elements spent a total of 199 operational days on the ground. Forty-seven of the sixty-six missions were US-led reconnaissance teams in-country and in the DMZ. Roadwatch missions were targeted against Rte’s 14, 614, 616, 922 and 926. Four ARVN-led platoons were active to the south of the DMZ, while one river was monitored, the Xe Lange. The remaining missions were tasked with area reconnaissance.

The majority of teams reported extensive enemy activity around their positions and each made contact with unknown size enemy forces. Two teams [CCN71-07-01-RT ??], [CCN71-07-02-RT ??] reported two enemy killed in action. A third team [CCN71-07-03-RT ??] engaged a group of twenty enemy, yelling in the Bru dialect. Friendly losses were one KIA and three WIA. On OV-10, directed against enemy positions, forced the enemy to break contact. Enemy losses could not be determined.

South of BA 607, on 2 July, a team [CCN71-07-04-RT Inturder?] directed two AH-1G’s against enemy positions resulting in five enemy KBA. The enemy was observed attempting to recover the bodies of the KBA and two F-4’s were called, effecting one secondary explosion.

A low level parachute insertion was conducted on 29 May. [CCN71-07-05-RT KS] The following day the team made contact with an enemy squad resulting in two enemy KIA. On 31 May a FAC observed an estimated twenty enemy moving toward the team. Four Cobras were directed against the enemy with unknown results.

On 22 June another team was inserted employing the HALO technique. [CCN71-07-06-HT Waugh] One team member reported by radio that he was injured during landing. When a WACO CITY team reached his reported area his weapon, radio, maps, etc., were all located, however, the team member was gone. There were no enemy signs in the area. We surmise that he may have wandered off, disoriented by injury. Daily FAC overflights of the target area continued.

From 14 May to 3 June a total of three teams [CCN71-07-07-RT Indigo?], [CCN71-07-08-RT ??], [CCN71-07-09-RT ??] in the A Vuong Valley interdicted Rte 614 to the southeast of BA 607 for twenty-one days. During the entire operational period, an estimated fifty-six vehicles and seventy-six enemy were observed. Fifteen vehicles were destroyed by Stinger and Spectre aircraft directed to the target area by ground teams.

There were three squad size enemy contacts during the operation resulting in three enemy KIA and four enemy KBA. Friendly casualties during the operational period were two US WIA and four SCU WIA. All were minor injuries. Elements involved in this operation were reinforced with a 57mm recoilless rifle and an 81m mortar to better engage trucking and troop movements, until such time as aircraft could arrive on station.

The trafficable section of Rte 614 appeared to be receiving heavy vehicular movement to the east. It may be possible that enemy troops are being shuttled down to a certain point on Rte 614 (near where the route becomes unusable) dismounting and utilizing foot trails for further infiltration into RVN.

The three US-led reconnaissance teams [CCN71-07-10-RT ??], [CCN71-07-11-RT ??], [CCN71-07-12-RT ??] north of BA 611 were unable to remain in their respective target areas for more than a day because of intense enemy activity. All insertions and extractions were conducted under fire. An ARVN-led team in the Laotian Salient [CCN71-07-13-AT ??] made contact with a platoon size element but no known casualties resulted.

The enemy continued to maintain an aggressive posture to the north of BA 611 and in and around the Salient. Active and effective counter-recon patrolling was again noted.

Near BA 604, a team [CCN71-07-14-AT ??] came in contact with an undetermined size enemy force employing B-40 rockets and mortars. The team suffered one MIA and 4 KIA before two AH-1G’s arrived to suppress ground fire and permit extraction. Eight hours later a WACO CITY team [CCN71-07-15-WC ??] successfully recovered the bodies of the four KIA.

To the south of the DMZ/NICKEL STEEL area, four ARVN-led platoons [CCN71-07-16-AP ??], [CCN71-07-17-AP ??], [CCN71-07-18-AP ??] were active. The only significant sightings reported concerned light vehicular traffic moving southwest of their location. All were out of interdiction range. There were no ground contacts reported.

Closer to the DMZ, six US-led elements were employed. One team [CCN71-07-19-RT ??] killed one enemy in a contact with a platoon size element. The enemy was reportedly neither aggressive nor well trained. Another team [CCN71-07-20-RT ??] directed four Cobra gunships against twenty enemy observed in a bivouac area. During eight days on the ground this team made contact with the enemy on five separate occasions.

One team [CCN71-07-21-RT ??] south of the DMZ was inserted twice in its target area. Contact made on the first day resulted in two enemy KBA, and three enemy KIA. The team remained on the LZ only ten minutes the following day, but escaped without casualties.

[CCN71-07-22-RT ??], [CCN71-07-23-RT Indigo?], [CCN71-07-24-RT ??] During six insertions within the DMZ, the enemy was encountered during, or very soon after insertion. Enemy strength was apparent throughout this entire area.

On 3 June, Hickory Radio Relay Site, [CCN71-07-25-SF Cavaiani] in existence since June 1968, came under siege by the enemy. Initially, long range, indirect fire was employed in an effort to weaken the defenses. On 4 June, five US and ten SCU with minor wounds were extracted leaving two US and twenty-three SCU on the site. Weather closed in on 5 June and precluded further air efforts. At 0450 hours the last radio communication was made. Fifteen SCU returned to friendly control. Two US and eight SCU continue to be listed as MIA. While we were unable to give a report on enemy losses, debrief of all knowledgeable personnel indicated that the enemy paid a high price for the capture of Hickory. During the four days of evasion the SCU covered some twenty-one kilometers to Camp Carroll and observed at least two NVA company size elements and numerous small groups of NVA moving throughout the area.

A detailed debrief of all personnel, reports of enemy sightings, uniforms, and equipment, indicated that the enemy element was NVA of up to reinforced battalion size. Further indications were that the element consisted of a heavy weapons section and a communications section. The attacking force consisted of approximately two companies as well as a reserve element.

All classified equipment on the site was destroyed utilizing built-in self-destruct devices, where possible, and thermite grenades. Defensive positions were adequate except against a large size enemy force willing to pay the price. All requested help and material was provided. Air support, of all kinds, was provided during periods of even marginal weather.

Very simply, it was estimated that the enemy decided that our presence on this key terrain feature was no longer acceptable and decided to exercise his capability to remove it. There is one other similar site known as Golf-5. All feasible and practical precautions are being taken to prevent the loss of that critical area. It must be emphasized however, that three US and thirty to thirty-five SCU cannot defend Golf-5. When the situation so dictates, extraction of personnel and equipment is the only solution. Here again, weather is most important.

Due to adverse weather, mission aborts have occurred frequently since 28 May. During this period one hundred fifty-five mission inserts were aborted due to unworkable weather.

The enemy maintained a forceful presence in the eastern panhandle of Laos. His primary area of interest in the Republic of Vietnam centered on an area just south of the DMZ in military region one. All reconnaissance teams inserted in this area met stiff enemy resistance.

North of BA 611, enemy activity remained at a moderate level, although four of the five teams had contact with the enemy.

The enemy also strengthened his positions throughout the central portion of the PHU DUNG AO, and in the Republic of Vietnam between BA’s 607 and 614. Trails in an area approximately twenty kilometers southeast of BA 607 were encountered. No significant enemy activity was noted to the north of BA 609, but teams inside 609 and 613 made contact with the enemy.

Two Important actions in the Vietnamization of the SOG effort are near completion. First, the relocation of 503’s Ground Studies Group to the Liaison Service compound should be completed by 1 Aug. This will speed STD assumption of many actions now taken by the Ground Studies Group.

Second, STD appointed representatives in each ARVN Corps and military region headquarters to relay tactically perishable information produced by SOG/STD directly to ARVN tactical commanders. This will circumvent the delays inherent in the standard procedure of relaying information through the JGS chain of command.

In the PHU DUNG and DMZ areas, sixty elements spent a total of 122 operational days on the ground. Average stay time was two days per team, compared with 6.4 days in THOT NOT. This difference resulted from several factors: A higher level of enemy presence, LZ watchers employed against a limited number of desirable LZ’s, and effective counter-raider tactics to canalize teams and force extraction.

Three elements were inserted along the border near Rte 9 without incident or AAA fire, which was unusual. Teams here are regularly shot off the LZ. The southernmost team [CCN71-08-01-RT ??] walked down Rte 9 without incident, noted the excellent condition of the road, observed and photographed two strand commo wire supported by shrubs along the roadway, investigated a tunnel entrance off to the side of the road, and inserted Soap Chips.

Other teams [CCN71-08-02-RT ??] observed recent trail activity and one team [CCN71-08-03-RT ??] encountered three enemy squads. AAA firings and B-40 rockets were heard in the Lao Bao area; the westernmost portion of Rte 9.

In action closer to the DMZ, a team [CCN71-08-04-RT ??] was able to remain on the ground ten days. Surveillance of the target area was limited by bad weather, but the team located a well-used northwest to southeast oriented, seven meter wide road.

Another team [CCN71-08-05-RT ??] managed two days on the ground, and observed several small groups of enemy. A third element, a fifteen man team [CCN71-08-06-RT KS?] made up of six Americans and nine SCU, was assaulted and overrun by an estimated enemy battalion. TACAIR was extensively employed, and at one point the team directed M-60 machine gun fire at one hundred enemy, caught in the open charging their position. Friendly casualties in the contact were five KIA, five WIA, and one MIA. The enemy suffered twenty KIA and an estimated forty [WIA], plus an additional estimated fifty enemy killed and sixty enemy wounded by air. Three hours after the team extraction a WACO CITY team [CCN71-08-07-WC Indigo?] with a mission of body recovery was inserted. There was no question but that readily available TACAIR and gunship support proved essential to the survival of these team members.

Two teams inside the DMZ [CCN71-08-08-RT Indigo?] encountered enemy movement, foxholes and shelters, recently used trails, and commo wire. One team [CCN71-08-09-RT ??] made contact and claimed one enemy KIA.

In summary of the PHU DUNG area, SOG teams met increased enemy resistance north of BA 609. Communications jamming was frequently encountered. In the vicinity of BA 607, and to the south the enemy employed swift and effective counter-reconnaissance techniques. Those teams which were able to remain on the ground returned with indications of increased enemy activity for this time of year.

Enemy presence north of BA 611 continued at the previously reported moderate level. South of the DMZ, and in the DMZ, there was the usual stiff resistance, and evidence of continued infiltration of fresh, well-equipped personnel.

THOT NOT and PHU DUNG activities were curtailed, both in number and effective stay time, by adverse weather and by a non-availability of sufficient aircraft to support planned operations. A total of a hundred thirty-four elements were inserted in both areas. This was 73% of the average number of teams inserted during a normal sixty-four day period.

In the PHU DUNG area sixty elements were active a total of 117 operational days. Average stay time remained at about two days per team, compared with five days in THOT NOT, which gave some indication of the enemy control of the area. Shorter stay time demanded a larger number of active elements to provide an equal intelligence gathering capability. Regrettably, such coverage was not possible. The scarcity of SOG teams north of BA 607 resulted from sixty-three weather aborts in September alone, and the shortage of air assets mentioned earlier. This shortage caused us to relocate ten helicopters from the 20th SOS to Da Nang, where they were used to insert those elements which, in fact, did finally get on the ground. This was the first time since the Cambodian incursion that the 20th SOS SOG assets were employed cross-border in a combined trooplift and gunship role. The air assets normally fragged from XXIV Corps, which were diverted to support operation Lam Son 810, were returned to our use on 25 September.

Both elements [CCN71-09-01-RT ??], [CCN71-09-02-RT ??] south of BA 614 noted enemy presence, although the limited observations showed no indication of change from the normal end of the wet season low level of activity.

East of the base area nine elements operated along Rte 9661 in the Republic of Vietnam. Seven of them made contact. It appeared that enemy strength was on the increase. In June, reconnaissance teams normally were able to search this area for five or six days before making contact. By August, contact came after two or three days. Teams inserted in October were usually greeted at the LZ, or soon thereafter, with AK-47 fire. A battalion size tunnel network was located which appeared to have been used within the past month, and there was considerable food production activity noted. Fire and noise discipline of some enemy units was lax; indicating that food production workers and small reaction forces comprised a good portion of the local security units. No vehicular traffic was observed along the route.

Proceeding north, the quality and strength of security patrols increased. This general area has been a 200th Transportation Regiment supply corridor into South Vietnam. A helicopter returning from extraction of the cross-border team received 12.7 and 37mm fire; an indication of the enemy’s willingness to defend a new northern bypass of Rte 966, and suspected storage facilities. Another element close to the base area was attacked by the first company size security force encountered in this vicinity. The force was believed to be hard core NVA infantry; probably part of the 220th Transportation Regiment’s security guard.

Somewhat farther north, air assets received the brunt of the opposition. During insertion of one team, the enemy directed automatic weapons fire at the tail rotor of the lead slick, causing it to crash.

Nine elements spent a total of sixteen active days along a known input LOC to the Quang Da Special Zone.

Five contacts were made with squad size elements which team leaders described as rear service workers engaged primarily in food production. Instances were common in which enemy personnel preferred to withdraw rather than engage the teams.

All contacts in the area resulted in fifty-seven enemy KIA and five friendly losses.

In the area between BA’s 614 and 607 team reports varied. One element engaged a squad size security patrol which appeared to be rear service personnel such as those encountered to the south.

Both teams targeted against the 969 exit point into Vietnam encountered first rate enemy patrols, booby trap devices, grenades on poles, and punji stakes; the latter apparently intended to canalize the team. This was the third instance in this area of booby trapped LZ’s during the last three months.

The six teams active in the vicinity of BA 607 encountered essentially the same high level of counter-recon effectiveness previously reported. Stay times were fairly short, and all teams made contact, usually with well trained, squad size forces. Those elements which were able to remain on the ground overnight found punji stakes and well used trails throughout the area. Ripe fruit, row crops, and freshly cleared areas were observed. Anti-aircraft weapons were heard twice inside the base area; once as a C-130 aircraft passed overhead. This was the second SOG report of anti-aircraft weapons here.

Insertions along the A Voung Stream Valley LOC came under immediate attack by enemy security forces; suggesting an active LZ watch campaign.

North of the base area two elements were inserted to locate a suspected motorable trail. The second attempt succeeded. The team heard two trucks and the sound of trucks horns before being canalized by a security patrol. The effectiveness of the enemy’s LZ watch in the entire area surrounding BA 607 is obvious when one considers that mortar fire and rapid reaction were encountered from the westernmost element to the easternmost.

A major enemy headquarters and hospital were reportedly located in the southeastern corner of BA 611. The reconnaissance team [CCN71-09-20-RT ??] sent to locate the headquarters did not find it, but they did have contacts with three separate elements, the members of which were well dressed, well armed, and attacked aggressively.

The interdiction team [CCN71-09-21-RT ??] in BA 129 was unique in that it operated in conjunction with a Pink Team. A five meter long bridge was time delay mined by the team.

[CCN71-09-22-RT ??] The team came under small arms and B-40 fire from 360 degrees around their position as soon as the slick departed the LZ. The team moved to the south of the LZ, killed one enemy, silenced three more by directing gunship fire, and beat off an advance by five others. The slick was called in for extraction while the zero-two stood off to provide covering fire. He killed two as the team’s zero-one observed and killed two others approaching from the zero-two’s rear. At that point most firing ceased, and the UH-1H came in for extraction. As the four team members got aboard, the door gunner killed two enemy advancing on the slick from the west.

In summary of the PHU DUNG area, SOG operations were limited considerably by bad weather and lack of air assets. Although coverage was reduced we detected no evidence of significant changes from past reports. The enemy continued to maintain a forceful presence in the MACSOG area of operation. His apparent strength and the effectiveness of his anti-recon program gradually deteriorated as his logistics net moved south from BA 607. There was, nonetheless, a detectable increase in the number and capability of security forces north of both BA 614 and 609. SOG teams noted food production zones in or near both these base areas, and farming personnel capable, in some instances, of functioning very professionally as security guards. The enemy concentrated his most capable security forces along the major LOC’s into Quang Da Special Zone and the vicinity of the road recently located north of BA 609.

Activity was roughly comparable to that reported last month. Bad weather and the lack of air assets continued as major factors precluding operation at full capability.

In the PHU DUNG area thirty-five elements were active a total of sixty-eight operational days. Despite an unexpectedly low enemy presence along the Dak Rolong, overall average stay time remained at two days.

Eight elements searched the normally heavy contact area of the Dak Rolong, thirty kilometers south of BA 614. The only substantial opposition encountered was in one target area. This could indicate that the enemy is shifting infiltration emphasis and security elements south to the Dak Su Valley and BA 609. Such a shift would complement the build-up of strength noted in BA 702 if the enemy does have serious offensive designs on the Kontum/Pleiku area for this dry season.

In between BA’s 614 and 607, teams concentrated upon the 969 exit point into the Republic of Vietnam. Both teams flanking the road were tracked by amateurs who made no effort at noise discipline and generally demonstrated how not to track a reconnaissance team. They were apparently rear services personnel. Neither team noted activity of military significance. The third team [CCN71-10-11-RT ??] engaged a reinforced squad which reacted professionally; losing little time in surrounding the team and forcing emergency extraction. These enemy troops were located farther east than previous contacts with counter-recon trained elements, suggesting the enemy is pushing his local security forces deeper into the Quang Da Special Zone.

In BA 607, eight of the eleven teams spent less than two hours on the ground. Surprisingly enough, friendly losses were held to two wounded personnel. Squad size engagements were the rule. This general situation existed since March of this year; the only change being the enemy’s slowly tightening grip on the A Voung Valley as an ideal food production area and an excellent LOC into the Republic of Vietnam.

South and north of BA 611 (stay) times were less abbreviated. The movement of well dressed, well armed enemy soldiers was observed and cultivated fields were noted along the streams. The westernmost element [CCN71-10-23-RT ??] killed six enemy and wounded a seventh. The element [CCN71-10-24-RT ??] near the border remained overnight before being ambushed by an enemy squad. The team withdrew but was later surrounded by a platoon, which demonstrated its aggressiveness in three determined assaults on the team’s position.

The roadwatch mission [CCN71-10-25-RT ??] targeted against Rte 548 was active almost two days and confirmed the trafficability of Rte 547 Bravo. The headlights of four vehicles were seen about two kilometers distant. This element made eight separate contacts with the enemy, killing fifteen before declaring a tactical emergency. A Spectre aircraft supported the team the better part of one night before extraction was completed.

In summary of the PHU DUNG area, we believe security elements of Binh Tram 37 were maintaining improved watch over the logistics routes to BA 609. There were substantial indications of a strengthening of the input LOC’s north of 609 which lead into the Ben Het area, as well. Security and transportation elements normally found closer to BA 614 appeared to have been re-oriented to support the 609 area. One team reported contacts with trained security elements, presumably belonging to the 220th Transportation Regiment, which may have meant an extension of the unit’s LOC deeper inside the Quang Da Special Zone. There was no indication of an altered enemy posture in the vicinity of BA 607. Harassing attacks by our forces still revealed a substantial number of enemy personnel tied up with local security operations. Finally, the area north of BA 611 continued to be unworkable because of adverse weather.

During the month of November, over 12,000 telephone and radio communications by all SOG elements were monitored for communications security by the 509th Radio Research Group. Preliminary analysis revealed a significant improvement over previous surveys. The improvement noted reflected a continuing command and staff emphasis throughout the year, including a special interim survey in July requested by SOG.

Activity in the Khmer Republic was at near normal levels, but weather sharply reduced Laotian operations. A maximum effort was made to effect insertions during breaks in the weather. Since 1 December there were fifteen days in which there was less than one hour of workable weather in both the launch and target areas. Nine more days had less than three hours workable weather.

In the PHU DUNG AO, December operations were almost completely stopped by bad weather. Up until Christmas Eve we were able to insert only seven teams. Despite the low number of operations, however, some missions were strikingly successful.

Five teams operated in the Dak Rolong Valley area. Only one team [CCN71-11-01-RT ??] made contact; although a second team [CCN71-11-02-RT ??] employed air support to discourage trackers. In both cases the enemy was timid in his tactics, suggesting, as was noted last month, that the trained and capable enemy elements normally found here had moved; likely to the Dak Xou area.

Team reports from the BA 611 and Rte 548 targets showed no change in the enemy’s strength or use of Rte 548. The two missions [CCN71-11-06-RT ??] against a target area reflected one team’s extraction under tactical emergency conditions and subsequent reinsertion. The team was soon surrounded a second time and was again extracted. The second extraction was a PHU DUNG emergency and supporting fast movers caused two secondary explosions.

A roadwatch element [CCN71-11-07-RT CT?] immediately adjacent to Rte 548 observed three vehicles and an estimated company of enemy. One of the vehicles was thought to be tracked because the team observed it twice make a 180 degree turn with no lateral movement. Airstrikes directed by the team resulted in two trucks destroyed and fifteen enemy KBA. Other airstrikes in the area resulted in a five ton truck destroyed. The team delayed extraction until the enemy located and surrounded its position. It successfully accomplished its interdiction mission and reconfirmed the enemy use of Rte 548 in the Ashau Valley for supply and infiltration.

Farther to the north two SOG teams [CCN71-11-08-RT ??], [CCN71-11-09-WC CT?] provided ground cover for riggers retrieving downed helicopters of the 101st Airborne Division.

We believe that the enemy is concentrating his forces closer to BA 609. Unusually low enemy presence in the Dak Rolong and extremely heavy enemy presence in the Dak Xou Valley supported this opinion, as did the detection of large truck convoys accompanied by tracked vehicles inside BA 609. Strong enemy presence continued in BA’s 607 and 611.

In comparison of PHU DUNG activity for 1970 and 1971, SOG ran a comparable number of missions; drawdown of forces and reduced combat activity of other forces notwithstanding. Some conclusions were drawn by comparing operational days. Our average stay time was cut by one third; we believe the primary factor was the enemy’s improved posture throughout our area of operations. Similarly the reduction of the enemy KIA to friendly KIA/MIA ratio, from ten to one to five to one, attributed to the enemy’s improved counter raider capability.

If you were involved in any such operations and wish to contribute to the details of what went occurred, join the discussion at the appropriate Green Beret Forum (linked below). If you have photographs, you can add a weblink to an image (or any) URL to the forum, but when I get around to pulling this off to a CD version, I will need to call upon you to get a hi-res version. Do NOT send the high res or even copies of the pictures to me at this time. I have divided the forum up in to several threads by Calendar Year. Title your discussion entry by the reference number of the operation you wish to chime in on. Make separate entires for different operations. If the guides that I provide don't help you identify the operation, come as close as you can. This is an experiment to recreate the after action reports for these operations (which, as far as we can tell do not exist). Let's see how well the internet serves to accomplish this task.

List of Operations	Discussion of Specific Operations
[C&C (Danang) 1965-1966 (Shining Brass)]	[Discussion]
[CCN 1967-1968 (Shining Brass)]	[Discussion]
[CCN - 1969 (Prairie Fire)] not yet details are available	[Discussion]
[CCN - 1970 (Prairie Fire)]	[Discussion]
[CCN/TF1AE - 1971-1972 (Phu Dung)]	[Discussion]
[Aviation Support For All of the Above]	To add to the narrative discussion, use theappropriate chronological category above

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Questions or problems regarding this web site should be directed to sherman1@flash.net.
Copyright © 1999-2005 Radix Press. All rights reserved.
Last modified: Tuesday January 25, 2005.

If you don't have the Green Beret Magazine Reprint, buy it before the stock is sold out!!!

Questions or problems regarding this web site should be directed to sherman1@flash.net. Copyright © 1999-2005 Radix Press. All rights reserved. Last modified: Tuesday January 25, 2005.

Questions or problems regarding this web site should be directed to sherman1@flash.net.
Copyright © 1999-2005 Radix Press. All rights reserved.
Last modified: Tuesday January 25, 2005.